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Iowa Politics
Iowa Republicans were worried in 1950. The 
Democratic party had dented their ranks in 1948 
by electing Guy M. Gillette as Senator and by 
carrying the state for President Truman. Political 
observers were wondering if these successes 
would be repeated in 1950, thus indicating a break 
in the state's traditional conservatism and Repub­
licanism.
The top position at stake was that of United 
States Senator. The candidacy of incumbent 
Bourke B. Hickenlooper was taken for granted, 
but H arry B. Thompson of Muscatine was the 
first candidate to enter the primary race. In 1938 
Thompson had defeated Hickenlooper in the pri­
mary for the nomination for Lieutenant Governor, 
but had later withdrawn, and the state convention 
had then nominated Hickenlooper.
The field of Republican senatorial candidates 
reached three, with the entrance of Earl F. W is­
dom, a Des Moines attorney. W isdom, a former 
Iowa public school official and the executive secre­
tary of the Iowa Rural Electric Cooperative, 
hoped to win support from the farmers.
Meanwhile, the Democrats were busy. The 
Democratic primary in Iowa is not usually marked
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by strong competition, since the candidates face 
almost certain defeat in the general election. 
However, an atmosphere of optimism still pre­
vailed from the successes in 1948. By Febru­
ary five candidates had entered the senatorial 
primary: Alvin P. M eyers, V an Meter; Ernest J. 
Seeman, W aterloo; E. E. Poston, Corydon; W illis 
M. Shaw, Newton; and O tha D. W earin, H ast­
ings. Albert J. Loveland, Linder Secretary of 
Agriculture, entered the primary in March, an­
nouncing that he would advocate the passage of 
the Brannan farm plan. As a result, he was la­
beled as the candidate put into the race with the 
blessings of President Truman and Secretary of 
Agriculture Brannan. Hints of presidential inter­
ference in local elections brought unpleasant mem­
ories of Roosevelt’s “purge” in 1938. W earin de­
clared that the Democrats of Iowa could “settle 
this contest themselves,” while Poston commented 
that it appeared to him to be a “plain case of the 
secretary of agriculture trying to name the senator 
from Iowa for the Democrats of Iowa.”
The “Brannan P lan” was already a subject of 
heated debate. One of the highlights of the N a­
tional Farm Institute in Des Moines, in February, 
had been a bitter clash between Secretary of Agri­
culture Charles F. Brannan and Allan B. Kline, 
president of the National Farm Bureau. Kline 
spoke first, to the alternate booing and cheering of 
a throng of 4,000; during Brannan’s reply, Kline
IOWA POLITICS 353
occupied himself by shelling one of the ears of 
corn that the Secretary of Agriculture had re­
quested be brought to the platform.
W hen former Governor Nelson G. Kraschel, 
“the old cam paigner/' entered the field in April, 
the number of Democratic candidates reached 
seven. Kraschel stated that he wanted to give the 
Democrats a free choice in a party referendum on 
the Brannan plan. Two days after the Kraschel 
announcement, Poston withdrew in an effort to 
avoid a selection by the state convention.
The second office on the 1950 ticket, that of 
Governor, was also second in interest. Republi­
can Governor Beardsley was unopposed for the 
traditional second term. Only two candidates en­
tered the field for the gubernatorial nomination on 
the Democratic side, but the resulting primary 
campaign was just as spectacular as that for Sen­
ator. M yron }. Bennett, Des Moines public safety 
commissioner and former radio ’ disk jockey," 
switched his party affiliation in January in order to 
seek the nomination, announcing that he would 
run as a "liberal, independent Democrat." A 
month after Bennett opened his campaign the 
Young Democrats of Polk County passed a reso­
lution stating that they did not "welcome" him as 
a Democratic candidate, undoubtedly because of 
his sudden switch from Republican ranks. Ben­
nett protested this action; Jake More, Democratic 
State Chairman, replied that it was the "privilege"
of the Young Democrats to make such a declara­
tion.
Tw o months after Bennett s campaign was un­
der way, Lester S. Gillette announced his candi­
dacy, supposedly with the blessing of the Demo­
cratic State Central Committee. Although he was 
not related to Senator Guy M. Gillette, some con­
fusion existed in the minds of the voters because of 
the similarity of names. However, Lester Gillette 
was a popular candidate in his own right because 
of his work in the State Senate and as a member of 
the State Board of Education.
The primary campaign in the spring of 1950 
was lively. Some of the more colorful incidents of 
the campaign were provided by “N els” Kraschel, 
the survivor of the greatest trio of Democratic 
campaigners that ever stumped the state together 
(M urphy, Herring, and Kraschel). Kraschel 
maintained that he was upholding the ‘‘integrity of 
the Democratic party” against the “hitchhiking 
Brannan farm plan,” which he denounced as ‘‘one 
man’s dream.”
President Trum an’s “nonpolitical” trip through 
Iowa in M ay served to highlight the political cam­
paign. The presidential train crossed the state on 
M ay 8, the President’s birthday. At the Ottumwa 
stop, the town turned out in force to welcome the 
presidential visitor and present him with a huge 
birthday cake. The thousands of Iowans who 
greeted the presidential train in Iowa irritated the
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Republicans; Robert K. Goodwin, Republican 
State Chairman, said that the stops were "nothing 
but political rallies/’
Local contests for Congress and for the state 
legislature completed the primary tickets of both 
parties. By the final day for filing nomination pa­
pers, the number of candidates totaled 392, over 
thirty more than in 1948, but not close to the rec­
ord 574 set in 1936. Republicans and Democrats 
filed for all twenty-one of the seats open in the 
State Senate. O f the 108 House seats, Republi­
cans sought only 103, while Democrats filed for
105.
On June 5, 1950, Iowa voters went to the polls 
to decide the issues of this turbulent primary cam­
paign. Over 256,000 votes were cast in the Re­
publican senatorial contest: Senator Hickenlooper 
received approximately 75.3 per cent of this total, 
carrying every county in Iowa and receiving 
30,000 more votes than all the other Republican 
and Democratic senatorial candidates combined. 
Governor Beardsley led the gubernatorial field
with 238,686 votes.
In the Democratic senatorial contest Albert }. 
Loveland won the nomination outright by polling 
37.8 per cent of the ballots cast. Conforming to 
party expectations, Lester Gillette defeated M y­
ron J. Bennett by a margin of three to one.
W ithin twenty-four hours after the primary, 
the election campaign was under way. The con-
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troversy over the Brannan plan continued. Love­
land reaffirmed his support of the issue which had 
been a decisive factor in his victory, and Hicken- 
looper pointed up the controversy with his state­
ment: “Loveland is for it, and I am against it.” 
Frank Nye, writing in the Cedar Rapids G azette , 
commented that it had been several years since 
the issues in an Iowa senatorial campaign were as 
“clear cut” as in this one. However, by September 
the emphasis had shifted to such a marked degree 
that political writers could call the Brannan plan a 
“dead duck.” Possibly a growing opposition to 
the plan, indicated in several public opinion polls, 
led to its decline as a leading issue. Loveland’s 
popularity with the farmers of Iowa could still be 
a cause for concern, however, since he had been 
well known over the state as the chief of the 
triple-A. In addition, the Democrats revived mem­
ories of “Herbert Hoover and the depression” — 
a slogan that had been winning elections for them 
for eighteen years.
During the campaign Hickenlooper called 
Loveland the “payroll farmer” and claimed that he 
was hand-picked because “he would be a rubber 
stamp for the administration.” Loveland retorted 
that Hickenlooper’s record showed a “startling 
lack of service to the people of Iowa” and that the 
place for a man with such a record was “back in 
his law office in Cedar Rapids.”
Loveland attacked Hickenlooper on the basis of
IOWA POLITICS 357
his attendance at meetings of the Senate agricul­
ture committee, charging that Hickenlooper had 
attended only 30 of the 177 meetings of the com­
mittee held since the beginning of the year. The 
strategy backfired when Hickenlooper cited facts 
from the Congressional Record: there were not 
177 working days; there were only 34 agriculture 
committee meetings, 30 of which he had attended.
The appearance in the state of several important 
salesmen’’ of the Democratic party was evidence 
of the nationwide interest in the senatorial contest. 
Vice President Alben W . Barkley made speeches 
at W aterloo and Sioux City, where he praised his 
party’s farm record but avoided any mention of 
the controversial Brannan plan by name. The 
crowd roared when Barkley said that Iowa should 
elect Democratic congressmen because “W hen 
you have Republicans down there, that’s taxation 
without representation.” In October, Secretary of 
Agriculture Brannan delivered a speech at Iowa 
State College on “Agricultural Policy.” Secre­
tary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin barnstormed Iowa 
for Loveland, while Senator Guy M. Gillette made 
three speeches in which he asked his Republican 
friends to support Loveland.
Declaring that “honesty in state government is 
at stake in the present election,” Lester S. Gillette 
centered most of his gubernatorial campaign 
around two major issues: the liquor control com­
mission and activities within the State Department
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of Agriculture. W ith  regard to the liquor control 
commission, Gillette charged that the Governor 
had been interfering in commission business. In 
addition, he asserted that the commission had been 
conducting its affairs in an unbusinesslike manner 
and “hoarding” unknown brands of liquor, partic­
ularly one known as “Old H ector.” Gillette prom­
ised, if elected, to operate the Iowa liquor control 
act as written —  “an act to promote temperance in 
Iowa” —  and declared that state liquor stores 
should not sell to “taverns, bars, and roadhouses/’ 
He also demanded that the Governor either call a 
special session of the legislature to investigate the 
liquor situation or turn the matter over to the in­
terim committee.
The issue regarding activities within the State 
Department of Agriculture developed when Sec­
retary Clyde Spry, in overruling chemists of his 
own staff and of Iowa State College, approved an 
antifreeze, popularly known as P-60, for sale to 
the public for field testing purposes. For this ac­
tion, Gillette demanded the resignation of Spry.
Governor Beardsley restyled his campaign tac­
tics in 1950. W hile he had a full schedule of 
speaking engagements, his speeches in the main 
were of the nonpolitical variety. Beardsley con­
sistently maintained that he was seeking re-elec­
tion strictly on his record. This approach was a 
definite contrast to 1948 when he had waged a 
vigorous campaign.
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The outcome of the campaign was closely 
watched by national observers, since the election 
of Loveland would have meant a defeat for the 
conservative Republicans and a go-ahead signal 
for the reviving of the Brannan plan. But Iowa 
was safely Republican at mid-century. On N o­
vember 7, Senator Hickenlooper was re-elected by 
a majority of over 88,000 votes; he carried all but 
fifteen counties. His victory, which had been fore­
cast as one of the closest of his career, turned out 
to be a ' ‘normal” one. Governor Beardsley won 
re-election by over 156,000 votes, a larger major­
ity than he had received in 1948. An entire Re­
publican state ticket, including eight Congress­
men, was swept into office. The only place the 
Democrats could report a gain was in the State 
Senate, where their membership increased from 
seven to nine. The nonpartisan issue on the ballot
— whether or not a state convention should be 
called to revise the Constitution of Iowa — was 
defeated by a three to two margin.
As a result of the election the Republican party 
became more firmly entrenched at the grass roots
— the county offices — than it was in 1930. Solid 
Republican county slates were installed in 52 
counties, with the Republicans electing 563 county 
officials to 128 for the Democrats. Once again the 
Republicans were assuming their pre-New Deal 
position of power in Iowa. Indications of Demo­
cratic strength, which had appeared in 1948, had
been dispelled. Republicans now looked forward 
with optimism to plans for the 1952 campaign with 
its larger significance. For in 1952 international 
affairs were likely to be at a boiling point, national 
politics were creating an ever-increasing interest 
among Iowans, and the state and local scene had 
many challenging issues which would inevitably 
confront the voters.
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